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ABSTRACT
The term 'existentialism* is extremely vague as is the 
term 'humanism*„ However, existentialism may be generally 
characterized as a protest against moral or physical deter­
minism in regard to man. And 'humanism', in its most general 
application may mean any system centered on the concepts of 
dignity and freedom of man. Thus Jean Paul Sartre makes his 
existentialism a humanism through the fundament of human free­
dom. He does this by drawing from and synthesizing notions 
of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger. The result is a u- 
nique concept of freedom.
Sartre begins, in the manner of Husserl, with a phenom­
enological description of reality. This kind of analysis re­
veals only a consciousness, "the being subject", existing sole­
ly as the consciousness of something,* "the being object"* It 
is a consciousness situated in the midst of objects which 
constitute the world. Between subject and object stands a 
continuous rapport of opposition, of impossible synthesis.
For, to see itself as an obj ect is for consciousness to ne­
gate its own existence. Self-determination is the way con­
sciousness maintains itself but only at the price of perpetual 
annihilation. It can never reflect or return upon its sub- 
jeetivity without by that fact ceasing to exist as conscious­
ness. Therefore consciousness must remain in a continual 
tension of detachment from any concrete determination. This
iii
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attitude of consciousness is the basis of human freedom. For 
Sartre human freedom comes to be a capacity of the being-for- 
itself to make itself be in a positive way by pursuing what 
it wishes to be without binding itself to any of its own de­
terminations, Consciousness,in fact, transcends by its free­
dom every determination imposed on it! natural, biological, 
or physical.
In its free realization of itself consciousness is given 
primacy over the world of objects, which includes all others 
outside the individual. What value they have is freely as­
signed to them by consciousness. Since consciousness is not 
limited by a particular form of being, the subject strives 
continually to go beyond what it is at any moment. This is 
expressed as a fundamental drive which implies an infinite 
possibility of being for the subject, and hence signifies a 
will to be God himself. But since there is no God, “man is a 
useless passion". This can only be a humanism on its own 
terms but its own terms are those of psychological description. 
But it fails as a psychology for the extremes of feeling and • 
experience are taken as the normal condition of man. What 
was meant to be a practical philosophy comes to be anti-phil- 
osophical. Man is simply an irrational hole in being.
iv
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PREFACE
Jean Paul Sartre calls his philosophy of existentialism 
a humanism* He defends this position chiefly in a lecture 
published under the title Existentialisme est un Humanlsme.
But the word "humanism", like the word "culture", has a diver­
sity of meanings, most of them very broad, To encompass all 
of these meanings within the ambit of the present work is un­
necessary, It Is sufficient to contrast Sartre's use of the 
word humanism with the traditional Christian meaning of the 
word.
Essential to Sartre's 'existential humanism' is a unique 
concept of freedom. It will be the work of this paper to as­
certain Sartre's notion of freedom and to note seme of its 
consequences in the realm of situation ethics. To this point 
no attempt has been made to show the fundamental accord of 
existential ethics and situation ethics in its extreme form 
and this accord can only be hinted at in this limited work. 
However, it can be stated here that certain motives and fac­
tors which Sartre pursues to the point of absurdity have been 
heartily endorsed by the sltuationists. If one were to take 
away the phenomenological frame and the atheistic presupposi­
tions proper’ to the existentialism of Sartre, one could say 
that the two ethics agree in their general expression, that 
Is, with regard to the moral values of conscience (conscious­
ness) and its autonomy respecting external norms.
vi
*
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I will proceed by pointing out the development of those 
movements and attitudes upon which Sartre draws, and, more 
particularly, by briefly explaining the chief sources of Sar­
tre's philosophical position. In the course of the work it 
will also be shown how Sartre answers, philosophically, his 
own humanist questions. The legitimacy of Sartre's claim to 
humanism will be questioned. Doctrinal inconsistencies and 
historical distortions will be pointed out and, finally, the 
consequences for morality of Sartre's notion of freedom will 
be explored.
Of the foreign works consulted certain standard transla­
tions were used for clarification. These include the Barne's 
translation of I/etre et la Neant (Being and Nothingness) 
which w i H  be referred to in the text as B.N. I also used
Bernard Frechtman's translation of Sartre's lecture Existen-
\
tlalisme est un Humanlsme hereafter cited as Exist. Further 
translations used are the Swenson-Lowries translation of 
Kierkegaard's Final Unfinished Postscript. Alexander Dru's 
edition of Kierkegaard's Journals and the Macquarrie and Rob­
inson translation of Heidegger's Zeln und Zeit (Being and 
Time).
I would like to acknowledge my appreciation and grati­
tude to Professor Flood of the Philosophy Department of the 
University of Windsor without whose patience and kind atten­
tion this work could never have been completed.
vli
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTI ON': BACKGROUND AND ELEMENTS IN 
SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL HUMANISM .
Tiie term "existentialism" has been applied to many differ­
ent reactions to both rationalism and idealism in literature 
and traditional philosophy. However, the contemporary exis­
tentialists are not in agreement on essentials. Some even 
prefer not to be called "existentialist", and even if those 
generally held as belonging to the existentialist "school" or 
"movement" were in agreement and their thoughts were reduc­
ible to a few basic tenets, it is of the very nature of exis­
tentialism to deny the priority of any essential note over 
existence, even in a mere consideration of the doctrine. To 
add to the confusion the word existentialism is the name of a 
"system" of thought. The meeting point of all sincere exis­
tentialists, possibly excluding Thomists who call themselves 
existentialists, seems to be in their avowal of individual­
ism. Because existentialism has so many definitions it can 
no longer be defined.2 It is better described as a tendency
1 "The refusal to belong to any school of thought, the 
repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever, 
and especially of systems, and a marked dissatisfaction with 
traditional philosophy as superficial, academic and remote 
from life - that is the heart of existentialism." Vfllhelm 
Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York: 
1956), p.12.
2 Ae Sartre himself says: "The word existentialism . . .
has been so stretched and has taken on so broad a meaning, 
that it no longer means anything at all." Jean Paul Sartre, 
Existentialism. Trans. B. Freehtman (New York: 1947), p.14.
1
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or attitude with a few doctrines common to all its exponents.
Taken as an ethico-social phenomenon, existentialism may 
be generally characterized as a protest against views of the 
world and policies of action in which individual human beings 
are regarded as helpless playthings of historical forces or 
as wholly determined by the regular operation of natural pro­
cesses. This aspect is negative, as are the protestations of 
existentialists against reason. This is manifested in a kind 
of crypto-voluntarism. All of this throws some light on 
Sartre’s existentialism. The negative elements are present 
in Sartre as they were from the beginning in Kierkegaard. In 
fact, the Kierkegaardian lexicon is basic in the vocabulary 
of Jean Paul Sartre.
It was from Kierkegaard’s use of it that the word "exist­
ence” gained the significance that it now bears as a technical 
term in existentialist philosophy. In non-technical language 
anything concretely actual may be said to exist, but in exis­
tentialism it is primarily human beings who are said to have 
existence. I'iien Sartre uses the word existence it is in this 
sense that he uses it.
The central tenet of Sartre's existential humanism is 
Kierkegaard's concept of freedom which he arrived at by an 
analysis of becoming. Says Kierkegaard:
If a plan is coming into being,, is changed in 
itself, it is not this plan that comes into being; 
but if it comes into being unchanged, what is the 
nature of the change by which it comes into being?
This change is clearly not a change in essence, but 
in being. But this non-being which the subject of 
becoming leaves behind must itself have some sort
*  ••
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of being.3
The solution to this, according to Sartre, is the concept of 
possibility which refers to a being which is nevertheless a 
non-being.4 Becoming is the transition from possibility to 
actuality. In this becoming there resides a freedom, for 
that which becomes must be possible before it becomes actual 
and the possible can never be the necessary. The necessary 
is a determination of essence - that which is necessary is so 
by its essence. But the difference between the possible and 
the actual is not of essence but of being; or, not a differ­
ence of essence but of existence. Necessity Is therefore not 
a synthesis of the possible and the actual but something that 
is essentially different from both, and, since that which be­
comes changes from the possible to the actual, that which be­
comes cannot be necessary.
Freedom, then, is established at the very core of the ex­
istent situation. It is a continual becoming of possibility 
for man, since for man everything becomes. Within the limited 
amount of time allotted to each individual he must go about 
his task of choosing continually his course of action, contin­
ually effecting his own becoming as it were, but doing so in 
anguish and dread because, fully realizing that since "free­
dom" is at the core of choice (the core of existence itself),
3 Boren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments. Trans. D.F. 
Swenson (Princeton: 1940), p.60.
4 Jean Paul Sartre, Being: and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel 
Barnes (New York: 1956), p.17.. Hereafter Being: and Nothing­
ness will be referred to in the text by the abbreviation BN.
%  ■
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the individual can never know what the outcome of his choice 
will he, can never know what will become of him. Kierkegaard 
points out5 that Hegel’s attempt to demonstrate that the world 
is a rational system, that “the real is the rational and the 
rational is the real," is not only presumptuous but ridicu­
lous, for it rests upon the assumption that a particular part 
of an as yet uncompleted scheme which is not in process of be­
ing created by itself could know what its completed form must 
be. It follows,, then, according to this theory, that no one 
can know his place, no one can have his duty proved to him, 
but that each must take his courage in both hands and choose 
as best he can. Kierkegaard conceives himself as having to 
choose before God with no possibility of knowing whether the 
outcome will be his salvation or his damnation.5 But Sartre's 
philosophy of engagement presupposes, and transcends Kierke­
gaard's choice because he is conscious of his commitment even 
as he writes.7
Kierkegaard wrote that "Sickness is the natural state of
Q ,
the Christian," and Sartre, throughout his works, Implicitly 
changes this to read: "lausea is the natural state of the con­
scious existent." For Kierkegaard God is discovered neither*
5 Soren Kierkegaard, Final Unfinished Postscript. Irans. 
Swenson-Lowrie (Oxford:: 1948), p.S61. Hereafter referred to 
as FUP»
6 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments. Trans. D. Swen­
son (Princeton: 1946), p.3.
7 Sartre, Existentialism. Trans. B„ Freehtman (Hew York: 
1947), p.66. Hereafter referred to as Exist.
8 Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, Trans. W. Lowrie 
(Princeton: 1940),. p.430.
•«
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by abstract reasoning or demonstration or in nature; religion 
is a matter of choice and since men must choose in partial 
ignorance they are, therefore, in a condition of anxiety and 
must, if they become Christians, pass through despair.9 For 
Sartre, however, one must accept this despair; one cannot 
pass through it. That is why “the existentialist thinks it 
very distressing that God does not exist.“ (Exist, p.26).
In a word, Kierkegaard's insight into “existence” was 
essentially a religious protestation. He saw man as confront­
ing God. Sartre, however, emerges as a humanist who has re­
located Kierkegaard8s religious protest on a moral and purely 
temporal plane. Sartre leaves man, bewildered, in a strange 
world. Through Husserl8 s phenomenology, Sartre engages in 
' metaphysical problems according to their ethical connotations. 
He is principally a moralist analysing metaphysical problems 
with moral or ethical overtones. He seems to be concerned 
with the humanist questions: What is man? What is his na­
ture? How can he know what he should do? Is he free to do 
whatever should be done?
Before letting Sartre answer these questions, however, 
it must be shown that the elements of his existentialist hu-
9 Subjectivity can be truly subjective only in the con­
frontation of the individual with God, since only the abso­
lute is completely indescribable beyond the inroads of ab­
straction and objectivity.. Only before God is a man really 
himself, because it is only before God that he is finally and 
irretrievably alone. But before God the finite individual is 
as nothing; and it is the bitter realization of that nothing­
ness that marks the religious stage of existence.
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manism are not simply "taken" from Kierkegaard bat that they 
are Kierkegaard's notions which have been reworked by Martin 
Heidegger in the light of Husserl's phenomenology. In fact, 
Sartre's main work is subtitled a "Phenomenological Ontology".
Husserl affirmed that a really significant philosophi­
cal renaissance could not consist in merely reviving a system 
of Cartesian meditations, let alone in adopting them as a 
whole: nevertheless, in the spirit of Descartes, its real
direction must be upon the deep significance of a radical re­
turn to the pure Ego cogito and in reviving the eternal values 
which spring from it. As' Husserl says:- "The world originates 
within us, as Descartes led men to recognize.1,10 He held that 
philosophers should turn their attention away from the world 
'and toward the inner experiences which are, he says, basic 
for our apprehension of the natural world and our thought 
about it. For Husserl, truth, the object of thought, is real­
ly or merely an inner experience.
Heidegger follows this course to the extent of claiming 
to describe fundamental experiences which are behind our 
everyday and scientific knowledge, but his account of what he 
finds when he exercises this method is very different from 
Husserl’s conclusions. Husserl was in quest of a "pure logic" 
of meanings; phenomenology would accordingly deal with "pure 
meanings in their logical interrelations, that is, with pure
10 Edmund Husserl, "Phenomenology", Encyclopedia Britap- 
nica, (11th ed.) XVII, 701.
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ideal content o n l y . A s  a philosophy, its task would be to
study the necessities and laws and identities resident in
the pure experiences of the Ego. For a phenomenologist true
to Husserl's view the essentials of everyday experiences as
well as of scientific investigations, are intuited contents,
12
that is, data of pure consciousness. The guiding axiom for 
Husserl was that things are as they appear, as they seem to 
be.13
Heidegger, on.whom Sartre relies Husserl1 s . .
method,, inverts it so that the emphasis is not c® the "thing 
itself" but on existence,■ Heidegger's human existence is de­
fined as being-in-the-world or Dasein. "being-there,1 a being 
which, without being anything in particular, yet is there, 
directly, necessarily bound to the world of objects. Being- 
in-itself is intuited directly, but is without potentiality
14or purpose, and consequently refers to nothing beyond itself. 
This is the fundamental insight of Sartre, namely that the 
world in which man finds himself is contingent, gratuitous, 
and meaningless. Order is projected into the world by man, 
and is not guaranteed by a God (Bn, p.424).
11 F. B. B. Gibson, The Problem of the Real and Ideal 
in the Phenomenology of Husserl (Hew York-: 1931), p.314,
12 Pari Welch, The Philosophy _of Edmund Husserl (Hew 
York: 1941), p.298.
13 See Husserl, Phenomenology, p.702.
14 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Trans. J. Macquar- 
rie and E, Robinson (London: 1962), pp.222-223. Hereafter
referred to as BT. -
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For the purposes of this analysis the most important as­
pect of Heidegger's philosophy is*-its underlying fundamental 
feeling of Dasein as being-thrown into the world without hav­
ing chosen or willed it. When it begins to take notice, hu­
man existence is already there, already 'embarked', and so it 
feels itself precarious, penniless, abandoned. Besides, the 
adventure will end up in the abyss of death. Meanwhile man, 
if he takes his existence seriously, recognizes the nothing­
ness, the absolute non-sense of things. This is dread.^
The me aning of the world, for Heidegger, comes entirely from 
oneself, from one's project, that is to say, from the origi­
nal and free manner in which one sets out, in which one real­
izes himself in the world. One exists in an authentic fash­
ion when, in expectation of ultimate death one conceives 
•projects' which will be at once his meaning and the meaning 
of objects, and all for nothing (BT, p.301).
Tnus man is described as cast into an unsympathetic 
world in which he tries to achieve purposes all of which will 
inevitably come to nothing in death. He may try to evade the 
thought of his own coming dissolution, by living his life in 
terms of impersonal and conventional generalities, but he can
15 Martin Kerr, in his glossary for Roger Troisfontalnes, 
Existentialism and Christian Thought, trans. M. J, Kerr 
(London: 1949')" p.vi says that the word "angoisse", appearing 
frequently in the philosophy of Heidegger, is taken over 
from Kierkegaard's "Angst" (anguished dread), the deep-down 
restlessness, questioning element in man's selfconsciousness 
which is aware of freedom, contingency and the awful terror 
of annihilation.
. T» '■
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9only be true to himself by living constantly with the thought
1 Aof his eventual heath.
Heidegger's account of man as inevitably given over to 
care and subject to a fate to which he can close his eyes but 
which he cannot evade is rooted in Kierkegaard and incorpor­
ated in the works of Sartre, Sartre, however, who believes 
that Husserl's phenomenology is the method for all philosoph­
ical discoveries, does not remain in the sterile world of 
Husserl and Heidegger. Theirs is the world of mere phenomenal 
description which Sartre sees as a result of starting with a 
reflexive cogito. For all of the phenomenologists, the cogito 
is nothing but consciousness, a consciousness in which, 
through reflection, one notices several phenomena and the 
description of these phenomena constitutes the phenomenologi­
cal method. In using the phenomenological method, Sartre 
avoids Husserl's idealistic procedure. He goes beyond Husserl 
and begins his ontology with his so-called pre-reflexive cog­
ito. What is at stake is the straight and simple affirmation 
of external reality (Exist, p.43).
It is from the position of the Cartesian cogito that 
Sartre will invaluably show the inconsistency of a belief in 
natures and in God. But it is the "Cartesian God that Sartre 
is refuting, not truly the Christian God. But just how can 
Cartesian mathematicism be reconciled with individualistic 
liberty in Sartre's existentialism? It seems that mathemati-
16 Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being, Trans. W. Brock 
(Chicago: 1949), pp. 224, 383-384.
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cism implies a universe of inalterable essences hardly con­
sistent with the Tree and autonomous existential man* But 
Sartre solves this problem by pointing out that the entire 
mathematical edifice raised by Descartes is subject to the 
purely arbitrary whims of a free God.* Who is® for Sartre® 
merely a projection of human freedom of choice®
* * * c'est la Xiberte/ qui est le f on dement du 
vrai, et la necessity rigoureuse qui paralt dans 
I'ordre des verit&s est elle laSme soutenue par 
la continence absolue d8un libre arbitre 
createur.
For Descartes® ideas do not testify to the truth of God, 
rather the truth of God guarantees the validity of ideas*
This, for Sartre, is the position of any Christian; he sees, 
the problem of God only as a Cartesian construct. Sartre con­
strued Descartes* description of the freedom of God as a dis­
located intuition of human liberty* The Cartesian doctrine 
of divine liberty was, according to Sartre, a mere hypostass- 
tization of human liberty of choice*18
Sartre believes his own position to be the logical out­
growth of Descartes’ system, (Exist*, p*45). Just as divine 
liberty is a hypostastization of human freedom of choice, so
17 J. P« Sartre, Descartes. (Paris: 1946), p*48 "* , « 
it is freedom which is the basis of truth, and the strict 
necessity which appears in the order of truth is itself 
maintained by the absolute contingency of the free will of
the creator*s
18 Sartre, Descartes, pp* 50-51. n. „ . Descartes finit 
par rejoindre et par expliciter, dans sa description de / 
iiberte/ divine, son intuition premiere de sa propre liberte, 
dont, il a dit qu8 elle *se connect sans preuve et par seule 
experience que nous en avons ’ * '*
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XI
God is a principle necessary for the Cartesian system and 
can be dispensed with if the system is dissolved. God van­
ishes if there is no system that needs him as a principle. 
Thus the positing of God is purely gratuitous and superflu­
ous. This becomes clear if man is free and without a nature. 
To say that man has a nature is to say there is a God. To 
say that man is free and without a nature is to say there is 
no God. Sartre feels that the same reasoning is basic in 
both Descartes' and his own argument. The identification of 
Descartes' position with Christianity is cavalier. To
understand this one need only consult Sartre's introduction
19to selections he has made from Descartes' works.
Sartre, leaving out the verification of God, assumes 
the extreme anti-rational position that the source and ele­
ments of knowledge are sensations as they exist in our con­
sciousness. There is no difference between the internal and 
the external, as there is no natural phenomenon which could 
not be examined psychologically; it all has its "existence" 
in states of mind. There is only intuitive knowledge for 
Sartre and, " . . .  intuition is the presence of the thing 
in person to consciousness," (B.N., p.173). This Intuition 
for Sartre is the free creativity of the artist, though 
Frenchmen today still interpret intuition as Descartes did 
in terms of freedom of thought,Nevertheless, Descartes
19 Sartre, Descartes. These selections emphasize the 
autonomy and freedom of man. See especially pp. 55-56 and 
83-84. ■
20 Sartre, Descartes, p.10.
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remains the,original exponent of libertlstic humanism.
II faudra deux siecles de crise-erise de la Foi, 
erise de la Science - pour que 1'homme recup^re 
cette liberty creatrice que Descartes a mise en 
Dieu et pour qu1 on soupconne enfin cette v^rit#’, 
base essentielle de 1'humanisms.21
Having located himself in a Cartesian world and drawn 
from Kierkegaard, Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre has a propen­
sity for psychologizing social relationships from a Nietz- 
schean point of view. As xid.ll be seen in the next chapter 
whenj examining Sartre's analysis of man's relationship with 
the "other", Sartre substitutes appropriation for love, 
utensility for co-operation, and retaliation in place of sym­
pathy for the 'other's It is sufficient here in the intro­
duction to indicate Nietzsche as another possible unacknowl­
edged; source of Sartre's existential humanism. Gabriel Mar­
cel has also seen the striking similarities in Sartre's work 
and says explicitly: . » at the root it is Nietzsche far
more than Kierkegaard who is the source of Sartre's existen­
tialism - in spite of the fact that he never mentions Nletz-
Op
sche's name." The "Will to Power" sets up every individual 
against every other individual and this is Sartre's world of 
"Ho Exit."23
21 Sartre, Descartes, p.51. .
22 Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence. Trans. 
Manya Harari- (London: 1948), p.17.
23 See Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays, Trans. 
Stuart Gilbert (lew York: 1955).
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By means of his plays and stories, Sartre is the maker 
of a new way of life which he has not yet identified. In 
them his characters never know why they should do what they 
do. They seem to be acting morally without reason. Sartre 
considers this problem anthropologically. There can be no 
ready-made code of morals for Sartre, because he regards the
death of God asa cultural fact. Once Nietzsche had proclaim-
]
ed that "God is dead," Sartre saw man as confronted with the 
profound responsibility of deciding for himself, choosing for 
himself, acting for himself, and being himself. That is, man 
has to choose authentic existence rather than becoming non- 
authentic and escaping reality. The crisis comes about with 
the loss of faith in reason, science and logic as well as re­
velation.24
Thus without commands, man has neither a past nor a fu­
ture; nothing behind him or before him; he is not provided 
with anything that can legitimatize his behaviour: "man is
24 Modern loss of faith is not religious in origin; it 
cannot be traced to the Reformation and counter-reformation, 
and its slope is by no means restricted to the religious 
sphere. Moreover, even if we admit that the modern age began 
with a sudden and inexplicable eclipse of transcendence, of a 
belief in a hereafter, it would by no means follow that this 
loss threw man back upon the world. The historical evidence, 
on the contrary, shows that modern men were not thrown back 
upon this world but upon themselves. One of the most persis­
tent trends in modern philosophy since Descartes and perhaps 
its most original contribution to philosophy has been an ex­
clusive concern with the self, as distinguished from the soul 
or person or man in general, an attempt to reduce all experi­
ences, with the world as well as with human beings, to exper­
iences between man and himself.
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25condemned to be free."
Shat is meant by the statement that, “man is condemned 
to be free?" In Sartre's view for man to be free really means 
to be free of God. This freedom from God imposes upon man's 
shoulders the unbearable liberty of pitiless atheism. There 
are those who comfortably hold a doctrine of atheism by pre­
serving laws of nature which they can fall back on for stand­
ards and norms. But Sartre, along with Nietzsche, feels that 
this comfortable position is impossible. For Sartre it is 
impossible to hold for natures If there is no God. He per­
ceives,an annihilation of,nature as a necessary consequence 
of atheism.
Sartre does not deny that there are physical things 
ruled by constant laws; his point is that, because man Is 
free,, natural laws do not apply to men. For if there were a 
God, nature would be his work and then one would have to fol­
low nature In order to follow God. But man is free, therefore
26what is true for nature is not true for men. Sartre finds 
no difference between a merely natural world and a Christian
25 Jean Paul Sartre, The Reprieve, trans. Stuart Gilbert 
(New York: 1947), p„285.
26 This type of reasoning is the result of a necessitar­
ian view of nature. It parallels the Graeco-Arabic necessit­
arianism in which there had to be a stable relation between 
things. This was necessary for there to be a science. There­
fore, there had to be stable natures. As a result, their 
worlds were described as being eternal and necessary. Histor­
ically, Duns Scotus opposed these views. St. Thomas made an 
adjustment where he showed that there could not be a free 
nature as is found in man. On the other hand, Ocham felt that 
there could not be any natures for that would restrict the 
freedom of God. And, so also, Sartre does not see. the compat­
ibility of liberty and nature.
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world. Neither one, says Sartre, can be true.
This is the heart of Sartre’s existential humanism: men
27are free, and human life starts on the far side of despair. 
Once men have realized they are alone, then life begins - in 
despair. Man must accept that he is doomed to have no other 
life than his own. He has to make his own way. If life be­
gins in despair, then the problem is to know how to live with 
it.
According to Sartre, this despair is reallya consequence 
upon the seeming probabilities of our actions. We can only 
hope in our freedom. Man is limited to some form of action 
which makes that action feasible, and he overcomes the des­
pair by hoping in his freedom. Sartre seems to be returning 
to classical stoicism.
Sartre has confronted himself with the philosophical 
problem of necessity and contingency. In his essay "Existen­
tialism is a Humanism", God is not even an adversary. Yet, 
one must remember, Sartre’s position is not a naturalism 
either, for its center is not nature. He refuses to deal 
with man as a thing determined from without. Sartre is not a 
philosopher of man's nature. He is not a theist or a natural­
ist, but a "humanist." That is, in a general sense, Sartre 
is below God and above nature, his concentration is upon man. 
However, in the history of European thought, the term human­
ism has had much more specific meaning than merely a concen­
27 Jean Paul Sartre, "The Flies", No Exit and Three 
Other Plays, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: 1955^ p.123.
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trating on man. When one uses the term humanism its meaning 
is usually derived from this historical tradition and implies 
certain attitudes and values as applied to human nature. Now 
it may be discovered that the connection of Sartre’s use of 
the word with the traditional meaning of humanism is very ten­
uous. However, that is a judgment which cannot be made here 
but which will be seen through the development of this paper. 
One should begin, at least, with generally accepted views of 
just what humanism means.
In its narrowest sense humanism, as a term, is used to
describe that kind of study of the Greek and Latin Classics
which is accompanied by the conviction that these classics
contain the highest expressions of human values. This has
been extended to include subjects which were considered to be
most directly relevant to the right conduct of life. These
subjects were regularly distinguished from natural sciences
and from metaphysical and theological speculation. In its
most general application, humanism may mean any system center-
28
ed on the concepts of dignity and freedom of man.
The great age of Greece issued in an anthropocentric 
concentration subsequently adopted by Rome and the thread of 
this classical tradition continued to exert an influence dur­
ing the middle ages. However, the great age of humanism is 
generally accepted to be associated with the Renaissance be­
ginning with Petrarch and Boccaccio in the fourteenth century.
28 Louis J. Mercier, The Challenge of Humanism (New 
York: 1936), p.3.
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These men developed a new attitude toward the classical past 
and gave an immense prestige to a literary sensibility formed 
on. the conscious cultivation of this past. According to Bab­
bits this was due to:
. . . the type of scholar who was not only proficient 
in Greek and Latin, but who at the same time inclined 
to prefer the humanity of the great classical writers 
to what seemed to him the excess of divinity in the 
Medievals.20
It was against a distorted view of man’s natural condition 
that the Humanists of the Renaissance, rediscovering the 
pagan authors, asserted the intrinsic value of man's life be­
fore death and the greatness of his potentialities.
The interest in this philological movement was in attain­
ing the kind of knowledge which would make men grow in virtue, 
and so there had to be included a better understanding of the 
Christian traditions as well as the Classics. The lessons of 
history were also needed as a basis for politics and ethics. 
Although these were the preoccupations of humanistic thought, 
the earlier humanists scorned the philosophy of the schools 
and considered the subjects of scholastic science as a perver­
sion of the true ends of philosophy. From the time of Pet­
rarch onwards, the humanists argued for a philosophy which 
would teach men wisdom rather than an arid art of disputation, 
and when they finally did turn to philosophy, it was to the 
Platonic30 rather than to the Aristotelian tradition.
29 Irving Babbit, "Humanism: An -Essay at Definition," 
Humanism-and America, ed. N. Forester (Hew York: 1930),
p®26a
30 The Platonic tradition of philosophical thought
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"In the Renaissance itself what the humanists came to empha­
size was the principle of mediation between extremes, of pro-
Gontlnuation of Footnote 30 
started with a reversal and this determined to a large extent 
the thought patterns into which Western philosophy almost 
automatically fell wherever it was not animated by a great 
and original philosophical impetus. Academic philosophy, as 
a matter of fact, has ever since been dominated by the never- 
ending reversals of idealism and materialism, of transcend­
entalism and inmanentism, of realism and nominalism, of 
hedonism and asceticism, and so on. What matters here is 
the reversability of all these systems, that they can be 
turned upside down or "downside up" at any given moment in 
history without requiring for such reversal either historical 
events or changes in the structural elements involved. The 
concepts themselves remain the same no matter where they are 
placed in the various systematic orders. Once Plato had suc­
ceeded in making these structural elements and concepts re­
versible, reversals within the course of intellectual history 
no longer needed more than purely Intellectual experience, an 
experience within the framework of conceptual thinking itself. 
These reversals already began with the philosophical schools 
in late Antiquity and have remained part of the Western tra­
dition. It is still the same tradition, the same intellect­
ual game with paired antitheses that rules, to an extent, the 
famous modern reversals of spiritual hierarchies, such as 
Marx1s turning Hegelian dialectic upside down or Nietzsche's 
revaluation of the sensual and natural as against the super- 
sensual and supernatural.
The reversal we detal with here although it has frequent­
ly been interpreted in terms of the traditional reversals and 
hence as integral to the Western history of ideas, is of an 
altogether different nature. The conviction that objective 
truth is not given to man but that he can know only what he 
makes himself is not the result of skepticism but of demon­
strable discovery, and therefore does not lead to resignation 
but either to redoubled activity or to despair.
The world loss of modern philosophy, whose introspection 
discovered consciousness as the inner sense with which one 
senses his senses and found it to be the only guaranty of 
reality, is different not only in degree from the age-old 
suspicion of the philosophers toward the world and toward the 
others with whom they shared the world; the philosopher no 
longer turns from the world of deceptive perishability to 
another world of eternal truth, but turns away from both and 
withdraws into himself. What he discovers in the region of 
the inner self is, again, not an image whose permanence can 
be beheld and contemplated, but, on the contrary, the con­
stant movement of sensual perceptions and the no less con­
stantly moving activity of the mind. ' Since the 17th century,
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portion and measure,, "31 The whole question raised by human­
ism was: what is the character of man as such, what is the
nature of man? Through the recognition of intellect and will, 
as distinct from matter, three basic positions on this ques­
tion of the nature of man are distinguishable in humanist 
tradition® The first is the stoic position that man may 
easily learn and follow the laws of nature which concern the 
achievement of a well-ordered human life. In other words, 
“Know thyself,“ for knowledge is virtue0 Opposed to this is 
the view that man has difficulty discovering these laws and 
even when he knows them he does not necessarily follow them. 
The third position is the Rousseauian view that the analyti­
cal intellect is a hindrance to man who is instinctually good. 
All three views are concerned with human nature and al­
though Sartre denies the existence of human nature, it will 
be seen that he is closest to the stoic.point of view though 
strangely enough accepting the second position as the condi­
tion of man. Historical roots for these positions are vague.
It is the second position, that of the depraved state of 
human nature which is the most significant in the later
Conclusion of Footnote 30 
philosophy has produced the best and least disputed results . 
when it* has investigated, through a supreme effort of self- 
inspection, the processes of the senses and of the mind. In 
this aspect, most of modern philosophy is indeed theory of 
cognition and psychology, and in the few Instances where the 
potentialities- of the Cartesian method of introspection were 
fully realized by men like Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, 
-_ one is tempted to say that philosophers have experimented 
with their own selves no less radically and perhaps even more 
fearlessly than the scientists experimented with nature.
31 Mercier, p.3.
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development of Christian Humanism. For the Christians the 
fall of Adam had disorganized the original natural tendency 
of man's intellect, will and sensual appetites to virtue.
To achieve order, the Christians believed that they needed 
the help of the grace of God. In other words, man needed God 
to lead even a well-ordered human life in this world, let a- 
lone the next. It is the inversion and degeneration of this 
notion into bourgeois humanism and naturalism that Sartre 
accepts as the present condition of man. It is this "accep­
ted" condition which Sartre hopes to resolve through a phen­
omenology dealing with humanist questions.
Sartre uses the word existentialism, then, to emphasize 
the claims that each individual person is unique and inexpli­
cable in terms of any metaphysical or scientific system; that 
he is a being who chooses as well as a being who thinks or 
contemplates; that he is free, and because he is free he suf­
fers; and that since his future depends in part upon his free 
choices, it is not altogether predictable. There are also 
"overtones" in this special usage of the word which suggest 
that existence is something genuine or authentic by contrast 
with insincerity, and that a man who merely contemplates the 
world is failing to make the acts of choice which his situa­
tion demands* As M. Natanson says:
Existentialism emerges as a deeply felt concern with 
and for the concrete reality of the individual; it 
Is his existence that is vital, and it is he who must 
define himself. It is no longer possible to lose 
oneself in the system or hope to reveal existence by 
analytic procedures used in the investigation of 
"life" or the.; "cosmos"a The individual as such, in
'« ■-
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his unique subjectivity, in his personal existence, 
is at stake; and existentialism holds that the 
essence of a person may not be revealed by reference 
to an a priori theory of man or any religious 
interpretation that speaks of man prior to and apart 
from his actual existence.32
It is this notion of human nature as being defined by 
freedom which has become the cornerstone of a new ethical 
structure whose proponents have as yet presented only an out­
line of how it might be constituted. The specifically athe­
istic branch of this ethics is implicit throughout Sartre's 
works.
The chief characteristics of Sartre's ethical position 
can be summed up briefly in the following points: the indi­
vidual, in an isolation imposed upon him by his freedom and 
in response to the requirements of his unique situation, must 
make his moral choices and bear responsibility for them.
There are no acts which are good or bad in themselves, no 
goals that are automatically worthy. There are no structures^ 
of physical nature, reason, or history above which man cannot 
rise freely by his self-transcending consciousness of himself. 
To this point Sartre does not differ from modern "situatlonr 
ist" thinkers, such as Reinhold Niebuhr for example.
What is new in Sartre's ethics is his version of the ex­
istentialist virtue of authenticity, which replaces the 
Christian love commandment. Authenticity requires of man not 
a code of conduct but a way of life. An ethics based on an 
essentialist view of man tends to take the form of universally 
valid content-filled norms, or specific rules of conduct,
32 Maurice Natanson, A Critic of Jean Paul'Sartre1s 
Ontology (Lincoln: 1951) p.2 
> •
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which Sartre cannot and does not admit. Instead he empha­
sises the obligation to live in a certain way. The term ex­
istence as used by Sartre therefore sometimes takes on a se­
cond meaning, that of true or authentic existence as opposed 
to the absurd existence revealed by the experience of nausea. 
Existence here is equivalent to the pursuit of transcendent 
goals, an important part of the authentic life, (Exist., pp. 
59-60).
For Sartre then, authentic existence is directly related 
to the being of man. It is a way of life which is in accord­
ance with a realistic grasp of the ambiguous nature of human 
reality. Authenticity is a kind of honesty or a kind of cour­
age. The authentic individual faces something which the un- 
authectie individual is afraid to face.33 That which he faces 
is the fact that he is nothing apart from his actions, the 
necessity to pursue transcendent goals, the realization that 
these goals are of his own choice and that he is responsible 
for what he has done in their pursuit.
Sartre does not envisage authenticity as simply the ac­
ceptance of a certain attitude toward human reality and the 
world. This is necessary and he says that man must assure 
his freedom. But true existence, for Sartre, is something 
beyond the assumption of an attitude; it is the making of free 
decisions.
o . . if man has once become aware that in his for-
lornness he imposes values, he can no longer want
33 Marjorie Grene, "Authenticity: An Existentialist
Virtue," Ethics, LXII, Ho. 4 (July, 1952), p.267.
> ■
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but one thing, and that is freedom, as the basis of 
all values. . . . the ultimate meaning of the acts 
of honest men is the quest for freedom as such,
(Exist., pp. 53-54).
This ‘free1, self-conscious commitment to a preoccupa­
tion with one's integrity will be more clearly understood 
after a closer examination of the condition of man and the 
concept of freedom in Sartre's view.
•« ■
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CHAPTER II
THE CONDITION OF MAW AND THE IDEA OF FREEDCM 
IW JEAN PAUL SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL HUMANISM
In order to view the condition of man from Sartre's 
point of view it is necessary to place oneself within the 
context of an existential epistemology. For the existential­
ist real knowledge must always refer to the knower as an ex-
"7. A
isting individual. ^ Now one consequence of this demand is 
that there is a basic opposition between abstract thought and 
the real being* for reality cannot then be conceived or 
grasped in a concept.35 In other words, the concept of exis­
tence is an ideality and the difficulty is, whether existence 
can be reduced to a concept. For it is precisely because I 
exist and the things among which I exist also exist that I am 
separated from them. So existence separates, and since it is 
the function of thought to unify, thought finds> resistance to
34 As Kierkegaard so well states it: "That essential
knowledge is essentially related to existence does not mean 
the above-mentioned identity which abstract thought postulates 
between thought and being; nor does it signify, objectively, 
that knowledge corresponds to something existent as its ob­
ject, but it means that knowledge has a relationship to the 
knower, who is essentially an existing individual, and for 
this reason all essential knowledge is essentially related to 
existence." Soren Kierkegaard, The Final Unfinished Post­
script „ Trans. Swenson-Lowrie, (Oxford: 1948), p«177. Here­
after referred to as F.U.P.
35 "To do so is to reduce it to possibility, but in that 
case It is impossible to conceive it, because to conceive it 
Is to reduce it to possibility and consequently, not to hold 
fast to it as reality." Soren Kierkegaard, The Journals of 
El '-egaard, Trans. Alex Dru (London: 1957), #1054.
24
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its activity in the very fact of existing. For that reason 
an existential system is a radical impossibility (F.U.P., 
p0107),
In terms of the individual who must lead his life in
very precise and unique circumstances, this means that reason
is really cut off from existence and life:
It is perfectly true, as philosophers say, that life 
must be understood backwards. But they forget the 
other proposition, that it must be lived forwards.
And if one thinks over that proposition it becomes 
more and more evident that life can never really be 
understood in time simply because at no particular 
moment can I find the necessary resting place from 
which to understand it - backwards. (J., #465).
In actual living, Kierkegaard goes on, the individual is re­
quired to make decisions, choose and act. His reason, how­
ever, tells him he can do one thing just as well as another 
and that is tantamount to telling him that he cannot act at 
all. Reflexion is simply an equilibrium of possibilities and 
one cannot act on such a basis. He is then caught in the 
incongruity between action and reflection; he must do that 
which is literally absurd to his reason. In the concrete, 
then, reason always comes to grief in absurdity. Recourse 
must be had, then, to something other than rational knowledge 
and to means other than reason, for attaining it.
Sartre's analysis and the view of man that results from 
it are really inspired by Heidegger's search for an answer to 
the question: what is Being? At the beginning of his main
work Seln und Zeit, Heidegger stresses the need for a return 
to ontology. Being, he states CB.I., p.25) occupies a
OHltESiTY GF E D J S  LIBRARY •
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central role in all of our thoughts and activities; it is the 
most universal of concepts; it is incapable of being defined, 
it includes man in its universality; we live within it and 
yet its meaning is always shrouded in darkness* Investigat­
ing the meaning of Being is, then, the basic question in 
philosophy (B.l*, p.23; p.48). But Being has certain demands 
to make of that investigation. The investigation cannot be 
pushed arbitrarily, the question can only be asked and answer­
ed by one who is a Being* So of all the things to which we 
apply the term “Being*',, only one can properly handle the in­
vestigation, that is, a Being that looks at or examines it­
self. Man is just such a Being. Heidegger calls him Pasein.
A correct and clear formulation of the meaning of Being de­
mands, then, a preliminary explanation of the Being of man 
(B.l,, p*29): the nature of Sein must be determined by anal­
ysing Pasein. What Being is will be determined by what the 
Pasein is, and for Heidegger the "essence" of Pasein rests in 
its existence* "Existence" being used not in the traditional 
sense of existentia. he says (B.l., p.65), nor as a property 
of an actual Being but as the Sein des Paseins. that is, hu­
man existence. So the answer to our ontological question 
must come from a Being that reveals itself to itself and man 
is such a self-revealing Being. In this sense, man is onto­
logical to the core.
If, however, this is true then Being is to be found in 
the phenomenon. Heidegger (B.I., p.SOX points out that the 
Greek worl.JEHSEilL. to which our word goes back, means "to
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be revealed" or "to show itself". So a phenomenon Is that 
which reveals or shows itself. Ian, then, is a phenomenon 
and the nature of being will be revealed in penetrating the 
meaning of phenomenon and discovering just what it implies.
In a word, for Heidegger, phenomenology as a study of pheno­
menon and ontology (the study of being) are not two distinct 
disciplines belonging to philosophy. Bather the two titles 
stand for philosophy according to its method in one case, ac­
cording to its object in the other. Philosophy is a universal, 
phenomenological ontology taking its point of departure in an 
interpretation of man's Being, an analysis of whose existence 
provides the clues needed in all philosophical questions.
It is likewise with an analysis of phenomena that Sartre 
begins his L'^tre et le N^ant and with an analysis of human
existence that he goes on to determine the meaning of being.
Realizing that Being is phenomenon is, he tells us, (B.l., 
p.XLV) the great advance made by modern thought, inasmuch as 
it allows us to reduce the existent to the series of appear­
ances that reveals it. Thus, he says (B.N., p.XLVI), we at­
tain the notion of phenomenon as it can be encountered in the 
phenomenology of Husserl or Heidegger, for example. (The 
existent, then, is what reveals itself. Notice that it does 
not reveal .anything within itself, it simply reveals itself .),; 
There is not something real inside it which the appearance, 
manifests; its appearing is precisely what is revealed. The 
dualism of being and appearing can no longer have a rightful 
claim on philosophy, for here we are confronted with a
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phenomenon, that is an absolute. Phenomenon is the real (B.W., 
peXLVI), In short, phenomenology is a direct looking upon or 
inspection of the givens of sensory experience. Such inspec­
tion confronts one, first of all, with "appearances*1. In the 
sense that one is presented with them, these appearances are. 
They would not be appearances unless they appeared. 'But if 
these appearances are, then, according to Sartre, we have lo­
cated Beingj for appearance .is being. "It is. That is the 
only manner of defining its manner of being." "Being is sim­
ply the condition of all revelation." (B.W., p.XLIX).
Wow just what does phenomenon reveal? Well, if there is 
to be appearance there must be that which appears and that to 
which it appears; an act of being perceived and one of per­
ceiving; the perceived and the perceiver; the object and the 
subject. In referring the components of these pairs one to 
the other, does the perceiving constitute the perceived so 
that the obj ect’s esse would be nercini? Wo, says Sartre 
(B.W.., p.L). Every idealism, he points out, seeks to reduce 
being to the knowledge that is had of it, but to be well- 
founded it should first establish the being of knowledge on 
which being depends. Failure to do that means the esse est 
perclni rests on nothing at all. Consequently, Sartre feels 
that in any solid doctrine, the being of knowledge must rest 
on something beyond knowledge, something that escapes the 
percipi (B.W., p.LI). Otherwise knowledge itself falls into 
nothingness, So to his mind the relation between perceiver 
and perceived must be an entitative or transphenomenal
*
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reference of object to subject, subject to object (B.W*., 
p.LI).
On the side of the subject, such transphenomenal dimen­
sion is constituted by consciousness in self, for as Husserl 
has seen so well,^6 all consciousness is consciousness of and 
is intrinsically intentional (B.W*, p.-LI). It Is, therefore, 
referred to object entitatively. Pleasure, for example, is 
an event before it is a representation of a pleasant object 
(B.W*, p.LV)• In a word, the phenomenon implies an intention­
al subject, the so-called "consciousness-self", which is the 
subject of the most concrete experiences but which Is more 
truly Identical with those experiences than related to them.
It has nothing substantial about it;, it is a pure appearance 
in the sense that the subject is a pure self-awareness ident­
ical with an awareness of (B.W., p.LV). As for the object, 
its percipi does not depend on reflexive consciousness so as 
to be constituted what it is by being known. It depends, 
rather, on the pre-reflexive consciousness in that it is de­
manded transphenamenally as the obj ect of intentional con­
sciousness. In the manner of Husserl, the being of the cogito 
pre-reflexively requires the intentionality of the ego and the 
being of the obj ect: not, as Sartre very carefully points*
out, (B.W.-, p.LIX) as the noema is the simple correlative of 
the noesis, for then the obj ect would be constituted by being 
known, but as something transcendentally demanded by the very
E» Husserl, Meditationes Cartesian (Vrin, Paris: 
1947), p®28. - . •
% .
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being of consciousness. Its independence of the subject is, 
indeed, Indicated by the constant stress Sartre places on its 
being active, never passive, (B.Itf..s p.LVIII). In short, 
being or phenomenon demands a subject and object intrinsical­
ly related one to the other: a being or phenomenon which is
phenomenon because it is aware of itself in all appearing, 
that is, it is a self-awareness or "being-for-itself"; and a 
being or phenomenon appearing to consciousness as a transphen­
omenal object of that consciousness but not reflexively aware 
of itself, that is, a "being-in-itself", There are, then, 
two orders in phenomenon, the pour-sol and the en-sol. (B«U,, 
p®iXV). The pour-soi is consciousness in its most simple 
senses For Sartre, speculation begins in subjectivity; more 
specifically, it begins with the Cartesian cogito, which is 
taken to be the root of all judgments and all cognition. It 
is “an absolute truth founded upon the immediate grasp which
consciousness has of itself, and as such is the basis for all
37other certain truths." Sartre recognizes, however, a pre- 
reflective as well as a reflective cogito. and through an ex­
amination of the pre-reflectlve cogito he tries to give a gen­
eral understanding of the en-soi, the other pole of being.
The pre-reflective cogito is the basis for the reality 
of consciousness; for there can be no consciousness where 
there is no reference to an object. This is ", . • the only 
mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of
37 j, Collins. “The Existentialism of J. p. Sartre'*, 
“Thought, Vol. XXXII; (March, 1948)3 69.:.” ~ • *
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something", (B.N., p.LIV). Consciousness cannot exist apart
from its active unfolding in the acts of consciousness.
Consciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure 
appearance in the sense that it exists only to the 
degree to which it appears. But it is precisely 
because consciousness is pure appearance, because 
it is total emptiness (since the entire world is 
outside it) - it is because of this identity of 
appearance and existence within it that it can be 
considered as the absolute, (B.N., p.LVI).
Consciousness is thus the cause of its own manner of being 
and is the identity of appearance and existence. Sartre's 
recourse to the pre-reflective cogito enables him to escape 
from the infinite regress of "knowing known"; for the coincid­
ence of existence and appearance indicates that the pre-re- 
flective cogito is an absolute in the order of existence and 
a condition of all knowledge.
However, consciousness is more than self-ref lection; all 
consciousness is consciousness .of something. Consciousness 
intends some object in the world. What is intended, says 
Sartre, is some "trans-phenomenal" being beyond consciousness. 
The realm of trans-phenomenal being is the realm of the en- 
soi. For Sartre, the en-soi is the rough "is-ness" of being, 
the brute confrontation of being; the "stuff" of the world. 
Thus the being of consciousness faces the being of the pheno­
menon:- the pour-soi faces the en-soi, and although both may 
be identified by a subjective analysis, they remain in alien 
and severed realms. If the pour-sol can be identified or de­
fined as consciousness, then the en-soi may be defined as the 
trans-phenomena! being of the object.
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Consciousness implies in its very being a non-conscious, 
trans-phenomenal being. “Consciousness is a being such that 
in its being, its being is in question insofar as this being 
implies a being other than itself," (B.N., p#LXII), The pour- 
soi (consciousness) is nothingness*
Wnat, then, does the pour-soi as consciousness reveal to 
us of the nature of being? Well, it is the self-revealing, 
and since our basic ontological situation demanded that being 
question itself, let us see what the pour-soi tells us of 
being in the experience of questioning. Any question, as 
distinct from an affirmation, demands that a yes or no answer 
be possible. In asking a question one must accept the possi­
bility of the non-existence of the being he questions. In 
addition, he reveals himself to be in a state of indetermin­
ation in even asking the question. A question, then, is a 
bridge between two non-beings: the non-being of knowing on
the side of the questioner, the non-being of the transcendency 
on the side of the one questioned. So in merely asking: what
is being? a new dimension of being has been revealed — • non- 
being, (B.N,, p.5),
On the side of the pour-soi such "non-being" is not only 
revealed as a condition of my confronting myself so as to be 
able to question myself, but also of questioning other men or 
things. To question them the pour-soi must in some way remove 
itself from being. On the side of the en-soi as object of the 
conscious attention involved in questioning, it must appear 
capable of giving a negative reply. For if a question is
* •
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aroused in a questioner by anything that just is, then it is 
occasioned by something completely and universally determined 
and the question would cease to be even conceivable, Ihere.- 
fore, the en-soi must appear capable of not-being. It must 
appear haunted by “non-being," According to Sartre (B.N,, 
p.8-12), it is by the attention of the pour-soi. in this case 
Illustrated by questioning but just as well by expectation or 
any other conscious attitude, that “non-being" comes into be­
ing. But for our present purposes, the important thing to 
note is that a fundamental note of being, its “non-being", 
has been revealed by analysing human existence. That "non- 
being" is just as transphenomenal and objective as is being; 
subject and object are just as transcendentally nothing. We 
have, then, in the case of Sartre, a definite conception of 
being taking shape even though it is properly man that is 
under examination. In a word, man's existence proves a key 
to the nature of being itself.
In developing his notion of the pour-soi Sartre was re­
casting In his own way the Pasein of Heidegger which is found 
identified with human existence, Man is a "being-for-himself,;” 
a phenomenon and a "consciousness-self," At the extreme of 
that consciousness, through the attention man pays to the ob­
ject of his consciousness, negativity or "non-being" enters 
being. It is through man as pour-soi that non-being comes to 
be. His being is, properly speaking, to negate being; negate 
it as by a positive, concrete act of negating. In short, man 
is really the link in being. The apparent hiatus • in being
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caused by the distinction between pour-soi and en-soi is 
bridged by a synthetic bond which is nothing else but the 
pour-soi itself, (B*N,, p«617). The pour-soi is, indeed,, but 
a pure negating of the en-soi. It is like an entitative; gap in 
being. It is a creative gap, for by its negating attention 
the pour-soi makes a nothing of the Individual en-soi and out 
of this overthrowing of the en-soi a world is made, (B.U., 
p.LXV). In a word, man's attention singles out of a vast back­
ground certain en-soi that now become objects of his conscious­
ness and constitute ‘his1 world. Man creates a world by his 
attention* It is, then, out of his negativity that a world 
appears, a negativity that Sartre attempts to express, (B»U., 
p0LXV) by saying of the pour-soi: it is not what it is, and
it is what it is not#
The "facticity" of the pour-soi is its pastness, (B,N., 
p«118), The facticity of the pour-soi is threatened and en­
croached upon by the en-soi: the "in-itself" attempts to swal­
low up the "for-itself." The "was" characterizes the type of 
being of the pour-soi: it characterizes the relation of the 
pour-soi to its being. The past is the en-soi which I am, 
considered as passed beyond. The past is "in itself" and "I 
am for-myself," therefore the "Cartesian cogito ought to be 
formulated rather, "I think; therefore I was," (B,N,, p»119).
In other words, I am the man who "was" the man. But in the 
same sense in which I am the man who was, I certainly am not 
the man who was, for I am the man I am.
The pour-soi. when it becomes pastness, is seized by the
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en-soi and rendered "facticity", but since the present is 
pour-soi, a paradox is involved. Alt bough, for Sartre, the 
present must be defined in terms of being, whenever the at­
tempt is made to specify the present there is left only an 
infinitesimal instant, a nothingness. This, Sartre points 
out, is the fundamental contradiction of existence: there is
always the indissoluble pair, being and nothingness.
The pour-soi. as present, cannot be seized as such be­
cause the present is a perpetual flight in the face of being. 
The present cannot truly be seized in any of its instants, 
for these instants themselves are in flight,
Yet the pour-soi exists only because it has a future.
The pour-soi of the present reveals the pour-soi yet to be. 
The "project" is held before the pour-soi as its image-to-be. 
The future world, says Sartre, "has me aning as a future only 
insofar as I am present to it as "another" who I will be, in 
another position, physical, ©notional, social, etc., (B.Ho, 
p.127). Sartre concludes that "I must become what I was, but 
in a world that has become from the standpoint of what it is. 
This means that I give to the world its own possibilities in 
terms of the state which I apprehend on it," (B.Itf,, p.127).
The totality of the self then, arises from the unity of 
past, present and future with the liaisons of "was-ness" and 
"flight" which bind them together dialectically.
The self holds within it the problem of its freedom, for 
the flight of the pour-soi toward its future is its measure 
of freedom to become what it will be. This freedom, for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
Sartrea is unique. The pour-soi does not accept or reject
its freedom in a purely conceptual way.
The future constitutes the meaning of my present 
pour-soi. as the project of its possibility, but 
that in no way pre-detemines my pour-soi which 
is to come, since the pour-soi is always abandoned
to the nihilating obligation of being the founda­
tion of its nothingness, (B.N., p.128).
Sartre concludes then, that the pour-soi cannot avoid its 
"problematicity" since the pour-soi itself is problematic in 
the sense of continually being faced by an uncertain future. 
This is what Sartre means when he asserts that man is a being 
whose meaning is always problematical. And so, the pour-soi 
can never be anything but problematically its future, for it 
is separated from that future by a nothingness which it it­
self is. The pour-soi is free and its freedom is to itself
its own limit. ' '
The nothingness of the pour-soi. is for Sartre, the pos­
sibility of freedom. Freedom is the "possibility for the hu­
man reality to secrete a nothingness which isolates" and 
"freedom is the human being putting its past out of play by 
secreting his own nothingness," (B.H., p.28).
It is in virtue of that negativity (particularly its 
creative, projecting tendencies) that man is not said to be, 
but to be towards being, (B.W., p.LXV). And because he is 
such a negative, projecting being, he is free. It is by his 
negativity that he escapes causal laws, (B.U.., p.23), it is 
by projecting that nothingness into other beings in expecting 
then to be other than they are that they too are seen to
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escape those same causal laws in some measure* Every human 
attention, be it question, expectation, imagination or emotion 
is really a judgment that "non-being" is possible in things, 
that they can be other than they are, that they escape rigid 
determinism. So negativity is the root and foundation of hu­
man liberty, (B*N., p«24)„ In short, negativity, being to­
wards and standing outside being all add up to one thing: 
liberty.
It is this identification of man with freedom that Sartre 
has in mind in speaking (Ex., p.18) of man in pure subject­
ivity and as a being that just appears in the world: to be
free man must just appear, exist and then freely define him­
self in existing. In this sense his existence is a primary 
fact, his essence must come from what he wills to make himself. 
The constant exercise of that freedom, that is to say his con­
stant existing, is attested by the feelings of anguish, for­
lornness and despair that in some degree or other accompany 
every choice he makes.
Nothingness reveals freedom and also reveals our anguish.
, „ . it is in anguish that man gets the consciousness 
of his freedom, or if you prefer, anguish is the mode 
of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is 
in anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question 
for itself, (B.N*, p.22).
Anguish should be distinguished from fear. Fear Is of things
of the world, whereas anguish is anguish before oneself; it
is the fear of having fear or the consciousness of freedom.
In other words it is fear of the non-specific or a fear of
possibles. But Inasmuch as he is a pour-soi, he.is properly
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man in choosing rather than allowing his decisions to be made
for him impersonally: he is condemned to be free, but to be
free he must choose. Thus, liberty becomes the only value 
that really guarantees humanity to man, it is the link that 
binds together all 'human' phenomena. (Ex.., p.56). In this 
sense freedom is the essence of man*
These notions of Sartre being established, It is now
possible to delineate his concept of freedom which is a nec­
essary establishment for positing Sartre's ontology as a con­
dition for humanism.
According to Sartre,' every action is, in principle, in­
tentional, True action implies a consciousness of acting on 
the part of the actor. Since action is necessarily intention­
al, no political or economic fact can cause action in the In­
dividual, “The indispensable and fundamental condition of all 
action is the freedom of the acting being," (B.N., p.436),
Freedom is evidenced in the pour-soi insofar as the pour- 
soi exists as "lack". The lack of the pour-soi is its nothing­
ness, Because the pour-soi “exists" itself through flight,, it . 
is nothing, for its existence is always non-static. The pour- 
soi is not that which it is and is that which it is not.
Choice, freedom and action are inextricably bound to­
gether In the existence of the pour-soi. There can be no 
freedom If there is no choice; there can be no choice if there 
Is no freedom; there can be no action where there is no free­
dom. And yet, as Sartre says:
To choose ourselves is to nihilate ourselves;' that is
■« ■
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to cause a future to come to make known to us what 
we are by conferring a meaning on our past. Thus 
there is not a succession of instants separated by 
nothingnesses - as with Descartes - such that my 
choice at the instant I can not act on my choice 
of the instant I. To choose is to effect the up­
surge along with my engagement of a certain finite 
extension’of concrete and continuous duration, 
which is precisely that which separates me from the 
realisation of my original possibles. Thus freedom, 
choice, nihilation, temporalization are all one and 
the same, (B.N*, p.465).
Sartre does not accept the common notion of freedom 
which is a description of those conditions external to man 
which allow him to choose among alternatives but rather free­
dom for Sartre is a state of being of the pour-soi to which 
it is condemned. "We are a freedom which chooses, but we do 
not choose to be free. We are condemned to freedom, as we 
said earlier, thrown into freedom or • • • abandoned." (B.2J.., 
p©.485). Since the pour-soi is in question in its being, free­
dom is its condition. "Freedom . . .  is not a quality added 
on or a property of my nature. It is very exactly the stuff 
of my being," (B.Ef., p.439).
To comprehend Sartre's freedom, one must keep in mind 
that for Sartre human reality is its own nothingness. The 
pour-soi, in order to be, must choose itself. There is no a 
priori essence or God-given human nature that the pour-sol 
can depend on or cling to. The pour-soi. "without any help 
whatsoever . . . is entirely abandoned to the intolerable 
necessity of making itself be - down to the slightest detail. 
Thus freedom is not a being; it .is the freedom of man - i.e. 
his nothingness of being, " (B.k7., p.441).
V ■
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Taken ontologically essence is a necessary determination, 
and in this present case would mean that man must be man.
But existentially man can be "not-man" by being inauthentic, 
that is to say he can simply go along with the crowd, so to 
speak, in his ordinary daily existence. In fleeing personal 
responsibility he Is not properly man* Existentially, then, 
man does not have to be man, 'human1 does not exercise a 
necessary determination. But what is existentially necessary 
is that for man to be man he must choose. In that sense free­
dom makes man to be man, it is the definition of man, (Ex*,, 
p.54) - but surely it is a moral definition.
The constant insistence that phenomenological analysis
38is descriptive, is noteworthy. Husserl has called it "a 
new, descriptive, ph.il,osophical method" and has suggested its 
use in completely revising the sciences. It is a search for 
essences but it is primarily psychological in object and in 
method, hence the strong atmosphere of psychology in Heidegger 
and Sartre. How recognizing that most of our contemporaries 
are trained to handle psychological data rather than the sub­
tleties of theology and metaphysics, one might well consider 
using such phenomenological analysis in searching for and the 
defence of a doctrine of essences. But a reworking of such 
basic notions as experience, consciousness, intent!onality, 
meaning and evidence would certainly be a prerequisite.
Farther, the investigations that have been examined here
38 Husserl, "Phenomenology", Bncyc. Brit., Vol. 17,
p.6998 (Hew York: 15th ed., 1932). . •
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are basically moral, and in this ontological considerations 
are secondary to moral ones. For Sartre being is meaningful 
in terms of man and man is defined by what he choosesj he ex­
ists in action, freedom is the supreme value and freedom is 
found in the transcendence of negativity that explains our 
knowing or being conscious® In short, moral questions com­
mand the phenomenological analysis which then becomes a search 
for negativity. To find it one is forced to examine phenomena, 
for a being that is other than phenomena will have a structure; 
it will just be and thereby resist freedom. It is not sur­
prising then, that Sartre himself should conclude: “thus,
existential psycho-analysis is a moral description because it 
gives us the ethical meaning of different human projects,"
, p.626)* In short, the being in question is moral be­
ing. In that perspective the notion of man being uncaused, 
making his own nature, creating his own world, being his past 
and the mystery of his being are all meaningful. Consequent­
ly, analysing such conclusions as are presented by Sartre 
should be the work of the moralist primarily.
If that is so it is obvious that the constant insistence 
on concreteness as opposed to abstraction becomes understand­
able. What is actually here is an appeal that moral being be 
treated as a distinctive kind of being, that is a free move­
ment towards an end rather than a being centered in its own 
metaphysical act. To complicate matters further, however, 
the greatest stress is laid on considering such being at its 
most circumscribed and individual level: the point where
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choice initiates the act towards its end, a point that must 
be experienced and is strictly incapable of formulation* One 
should insist, however, that even here there is a radical in­
telligibility to be recognized. Unfortunately, for Sartre, 
the Kantian antithesis of speculative and practical reason 
has cast its shadow over his analysis as it has been followed, 
so that his resulting treatment of moral being is a non-intel­
lectual one* Thus, the moral order becomes an order of magic 
for Sartre. One must strive to reintegrate intellectual 
principles into the moral order without destroying the formal 
character of moral being:' the moral must be shown to be "in­
telligible1 and at the same time "free." To do this it is 
necessary to remove the illusion that intellectual principles, 
since they guide speculative reason, bring physical necessity 
in their wake and are antithetical to freedom.
And finally,, to do so it would appear necessary to insist 
on the fundamental difference between physical and spiritual 
nature. Tne former is closed by matter and determined in oper­
ation; the latter open and free in operation, containing 
rather than being contained.
Eat since the analysis of Sartre's investigation of be­
ing shows his consideration to be basically moral, there is 
one more concept in his phenomenology which must be looked at 
before attempting to assess his existential humanism* It is 
the relation of the "self" to the "other".
For Sartre the "other" is immediately known or "encount­
ered". It has the nature of a contingent but irreducible
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factS/ and therefore Sartre says that the existence of the 
"other1' cannot be derived ontologically. And yet, for Sartre, 
there is in every day reality an original relation to the 
"other" which can be constantly sought and which is disclosed 
outside of all reference to God.
The basis for this original relation to the other is the 
very "appearance" of the other. As Sartre says, "the very 
appearance of the other in my; universe of an element of dis­
integration of this universe is what I call the appearance of 
a man in my universe," (B.flT., p.225)„ The other shocks this 
world of self in an original, unique and irreducible manner.
"I cannot be the object of an object," says Sartre, and yet,
. • at each instant the other looks at me," (B.N*, p.257). 
The basis of the solution to the problem of the other 
will be the "look". But what does it mean, for Sartre, to be
seen? "The other's look hides his eyes; he seems to go in
front of them," (B.N., p.258). What Sartre is referring to, 
here, is the conscious look of another - which has already 
been shown to be a, nothingness which nlhllates.
What I apprehend immediately when I hear the branches 
crackling behind me is not that there is someone 
there; it is that I am vulnerable, that I have a body 
which can be hurt, that I occupy a place and that I 
can not in any case escape from the space in which I 
am . . .  in short, that I am "seen", (B.U., p.259).
As long as one is a pure consciousness of things to be
done or to be used, he is safe. "I do what I have to.do. Wo
transcending view comes to confer upon my acts the character
of a given on which a judgment can be brought to bear," (B.W.,
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p.259).
Shame reveals to the self the look of the other. *'I see 
myself because somebody sees me,'* (B.N., p.260). Shame, for 
Sartre, means that "I am the object the other is looking at,” 
(B.N., p.261). To apprehend himself as seen is, for Sartre, 
the alienation of the world which he organized. The other is 
the hidden death of his possibilities in the world. The 
other looks at him and in the look, shocks or haemorrhages 
his inner unity, his inner world, his subjectivity. The re­
covery of this inner world of the self is possible by a re­
taliation against the other, i.e,, by making the other the 
object of my look and destroying his inner unity. By the look 
of the other Sartre has been made an object for the other's 
subjectivity and the other knows him only as object, never as 
subject. In the same manner, Sartre knows the other as ob­
ject, never as subject.
This very notion extended to include a social conscious­
ness leads men through bad faith, to postulate the existence 
of God by the experience of being an ”us-object”.
This experience occurs when a group Identifies itself 
as such In relation to another group or person who 
looks at them as obj ects. A number of persons see 
themselves as forming a definite group or community 
when they find themselves so classed in the view of 
a third party. If the third party is a foreigner, the 
reaction is a consciousness of nationality. For 
example, the presence of the bourgeois is required for 
the class solidarity of the proletariat,39
39 Norman Greene. The Existentialist Ethic (Ann Arbor: 
1960), p.70.
*
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This effort at recovering the human totality can not 
take place without positing the existence of a "third", 
who is on principle distinct from humanity and in 
whose eyes humanity is wholly object . . . this con­
cept is the same as that of the being-who-looks-at 
and who can never be looked-at; that is, it is one 
with the idea of God, (B*H,, p„423).
Bearing these notions of the totality of the self, the 
nihilation of God, the shock of the •'other11,, the anguish of 
choice and the condemnation to freedom, it is time now to 
determine the implications for modern morality of Jean Paul 
Sartre's concept of freedom as made explicit in his existen­
tial humanism®
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CONCLUSION AND CRITICISM REGARDING 
JEAN PAUL SARTRE8 S EXISTENTIAL HUMANISM
Given the essential ambiguity of the “human condition'*,
of a freedom —  situated, two alternatives remain open to con­
sciousness: to lose self in the objective or to establish
self in pure freedom by renunciation of fixed determinations, 
of every form of concrete existence. According to Sartre the 
only authentic attitude, the only morality which can save the
true nature of consciousness is neither of the alternatives
mentioned, but the engagement of self with objects without at 
the same time becoming the slave of the en-sol. an engagement 
in freedom that is always active and repudiative, constantly 
engaged with the world yet never estranged from self, ever 
disposed to new realisations but never moulded to some static, 
definite manner of being.
The freedom of ambiguity represents a conquest which 
each one must reach by himself through personal and painful 
effort. From the initial, spontaneous encounter with the 
world by which one is enticed and disarmed by it one must 
pass through the phase of the reflection which is complicity 
to that of the reflection which is purification. In this 
final stage is placed the moral problem of fidelity to the 
authentic demands of the human condition. Man must continu­
ally make choices, create for himself his particular essence,
46 ■
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fora his personality. It is not something already constituted 
by a natural determinism but something demanding discovery or 
invention? by each person: in this consists man's particular
moral duty.
The idea of a totally personal solution of moral problems, 
a solution "created" from situation to situation, is a focal 
point common to some extent to all existentialist theoreti­
cians, In It there is nothing absolute or universal which 
would be valid for all individuals, since the real is always 
the concrete and particular, Man can never appeal to univer­
sal norms to escape the obligation of judging for himself 
what conduct he ought to assume in this instance of existence.
Sartre is adverse to all that is fixed, definite or im­
personal. These are in fact characteristics of the "absurd" 
to which the dynamism of the "being-for-itself" is opposed, 
Sartre invokes an "existential psychanalysls" which controls 
behavior and the projected ends of the Individual and places 
him on guard against the enslavement of freedom in a mode of 
being which is not authentic, that is, not ambiguous.
Every objective value which man seeks to realize is lost 
In the effort if he makes it his goal. Even the attempt to 
become God "that is, to be of oneself the conscious founda­
tion of one's own en-sol" is a self-contradictory project in­
asmuch as it would necessarily bring one to a fixation of 
consciousness in a determinate state and therefore to the ex­
tinction of freedom.
For Sartre, consequently, the good or evil of acts does
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
not derive from an external norm* Ike will itself bestows 
good or bad upon them by willing them freely* Man can will 
everything and never reject anything, because by the very 
fact that he wills anything at all that thing becomes fully 
licit* Sartre's ideal of an authentic realization of the 
"conscious being" is that of a freedom which is totally in­
toxicated with itself, which refuses none of its possibilities 
of being, which is permitted everything, which rejects every 
restriction that pretends to bind it, and at the same time a 
freedom which attaches itself to nothing, which binds itself 
to none of those things which it chooses to be or which it 
does*
The affirmation of a total and gratuitous human freedom 
as opposed to a superior and all comprehensive moral order, 
both divine and natural, releases man from any directive bond 
whatever and crowns him with an autonomy as absolute as it is
vacuous* No value can now impose itself upon him as obliga- .
tosy, The individual becomes the creator of his values, his
own internal law. It is clear that this is an ethic of the
arbitrary and hence no ethic. Human life according to Sar­
tre, with all the moral values by which humanity lives and 
is nourished, is simply impossible* Without God man cannot 
comprehend even himself.
The extraordinary appeal of Sartre is witness to his a- 
blllty to grasp and interpret the spiritual situation of the 
post-war generation* To young people who place no hope in 
anything, he has cast a new anchor of salvation, however
>  ■
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strange it may seem, their very desperation. He says: live
as you like, without willing anything. This is freedom. 
Desperation is itself a way of life, indeed, the one most 
consonant with the insignificance of llfe.4^
A lucid despair, an implacable pessimism about man's 
condition and the presumed values and Ideals he has always 
sought, and an acute sense of the vanity of. things, is what - 
pervades every page of Sartre. Cast willy nllly into an ab­
surd world, one must engage in life without hoping for any­
thing from it while enjoying with full freedom the rare mo­
ments of pleasure that it offers. In to-day's world where 
many do not believe in anything or hope for anything, why med­
dle with unverifiable prescriptions or metaphysical creeds 
which can only induce self-torture and unrest? It is to the 
present existential reality that one must attach himself, not 
to find support in it, since it is inconsistent, but to take 
only that little good which it has to offer.
The impossibility of an existential ethics has its meta­
physical basis in the exaltation of "being" as antecedent and 
opposed to thought. To ontological phenomenalism logically
40 A compendious view of Jean Paul Sartre's philosophy 
can be had by reading the lecture he gave in Paris in 1945.
This work later published, is grounded on the "metaphysic" 
developed by his larger work, L»~^ tre et le neant. Even Sar­
tre's more popular stories and his plays are less literary 
than they are doctrinaire. For just as Being and Nothingness 
provides an ontological roost from which he may jump into the 
void of his own creating, so also the characters in his writ­
ings, who seem to be absolutely irrational at times, are really 
graphic demonstrations of Sartre's brand of existentialism put 
into action. His characters are-"humanistic" in the highest 
Sartrean sense of the word, and the short works in which they 
appear are catechetical expositions of an atheistic theology 
which is specifically a humanism.
*
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corresponds an ethical atomism* both presented in the light 
of a false horizontal transcendentalism..
The question may now be asked whether Jean Paul Sartre's 
existentialism would have to conform to traditional notions 
(as pointed out in the introduction to this paper) of human­
ism in order to call itself a humanism. It would seem not, 
for the problem here is to see whether Sartre's existential­
ism is a humanism on its own terms or whether it is guilty of 
its own "bad faith."
"Bad faith" means, for Sartre, dishonesty. However, dis­
honesty without any moral criteria, simply means a certain in­
consistency in the face of "reality”® Here then, are a few of 
Sartre's inconsistencies.
In the first part of his essay, "Existentialism is a hu­
manism", Sartre implies that he is struggling against the po­
wers- that-be; that he is resisting authority and trying to 
rise above his station. He is a romantic who leaves to man 
the possibility of choice. And yet Sartre maintains that "wa 
do not believe in progress. Progress is betterment, but man 
is always the same. The situation confronting him varies.
But the choice always remains a choice in a situation,”
Cckist., p.52). So, man rises above his station, but he can­
not progress.
For Sartre, "there does exist a universal human condi­
tion, “ (Exist., p.45). The limits are neither subjective nor 
objective; rather they have two sides. They are objective 
because found everywhere, and subjective because they are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
non-existent unless lived by man; as he says, "There is a uni­
versality of man but it is not given, it is perpetually be­
ing made," (Exist®, p.47). Then, man is a mystery who can 
never be what he is until he is dead.
Again Sartre says that there is no reality except in ac­
tion, for man is nothing else than his plan; he exists only to 
the extent that he fulfils himself. Man is nothing else than 
a series of undertakings; he is the sum, the organization, the 
ensemble of the relationships which make up these undertakings. 
In other words, " . . .  the coward makes himself cowardly, and 
the hero makes himself heroic," (Exist., p.41). It is because 
of this flux that a man can never be a being-in-itself in the 
present. It is only the past that.can be grasped or stati- . 
cized. That is why a man both is and is not what he is and 
he cannot totally be what he is until he is dead.
Since the project in the future will involve new condi­
tions, man can never really know what he will be and yet Sar­
tre states that "there is no doctrine more optimistic, since 
man's destiny is within himself," (Exist., p.42).
Sartre starts with the so-called simple, subjective 
truth that "outside the Cartesian cogito, all views are only 
probable," (Exist., p.44) and he elaborates a theory of prob­
ability ,,based on it. For Sartre, “this theory is the only 
one which gives man dignity, the only one which does not re­
duce him to an object," (Exist., p.43). But man reduces him­
self to an object in continually striving to be the project 
that he has created for himself. '
i ■
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Man must accept the situation in which he finds himself, 
and yet he is responsible for this situation* "Existential­
ism's first move is to make every man aware of what he is and 
to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on 
him," (Exist*. p.19)*
For Sartre, man is a choosing, a self-creating subject­
ivity and therefore every choice is not only the best choice 
for him but also contains the image of what he wills to be.
At first sight this does not seem to be consistent with his 
notion that man chooses in anxiety because he is not only 
choosing what he will be but also legislating what all man­
kind ought to be, (Exist,, p.20), But where is the anguish 
in making a choice which is necessarily good or the best? 
Gould it be that anguish in this existential system stems 
from the fact that there are no standards for comparative de­
grees of choice since the choice is simply subjective? „ It 
would seem then that such words as "the good" or "the best" 
are meaningless and that anguish is a result of this meaning­
lessness. But Sartre points out that his anguish is a corre­
lative of the question which each man must ask himself before 
making a choice. "Am I really the kind of man who has the 
right to act in such a way that humanity might guide itself 
by my actions?" (Exist., p.34). The anguish here is a result 
of the fact that there is no answer to the question. This 
question does not, and is not, supposed to indicate a sym­
pathy for one's fellow man. It simply must be asked because 
the new world which "I" am about to create by "my" choice
> ■
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will involve the other in a new situation and, of course, one 
does not know what this situation will he. There is certain­
ly no concern here/ for the "other" "I" can never get to know 
as subject, who shatters "my" inner unity, who objectivizes 
"me", who is an intruder into "my" world, and whom "I" must 
look at, objectivize, in order to regain equilibrium.
There is a paradox involved here for Sartre says that he 
perceives all others as the "condition of his own existence," 
(Exist,. p«24). In order to get any truth about oneself, one 
must have contact with another person. But the contact shat­
ters one's inner unity; one is no longer oneself, "Every man 
who sets up a determinism is a dishonest man," (Exist., p.53). 
And yet, just previous to this statement, Sartre had said: 
"This inability to not make a choice is absolute," (Exist., 
p.47). If a man in making a choice does so in anguish because 
he does not know how it will turn out or what he will be and 
yet his future depends upon this choice, is this not an ir­
rational and non-deliberate determinism? But for Sartre man 
is freedom.
Every action of man is subject to a moral interpretation. 
"Nothing is excusable, man is responsible for his passion," 
(Exist., p.27). But there are no objective moral principles. 
"Moral choice is to be compared to the making of a work of 
art. In choosing his ethics, man makes himself," (Exist., 
p,49)0
The fundamental relation of man with others is conflict. 
"Hell is other people." "The other haemorrhages my inner
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unity. " The other is an element of disintegration in my uni­
verse. And yet Sartre says:
. . . the subjectivity that we have thus arrived
at, and which we have claimed to be truth, is
not a strictly individual subjectivity, for we 
have demonstrated that one discovers in the cogito 
not only himself, but others as well, (Exist.. 
p.44).
In fact a man cannot know himself except as objectivized by ‘ 
the other. In spite of the conflict, man must commit himself 
to others.
In spite of the apparent contradictions and ambiguities 
of an essentially negativistic, pessimistic philosophy of ir­
rationalism, Sartre has built a rational system centered up­
on man and his condition. He has tried to answer the ques­
tions: What is man? Where is he going? and How shall he go
about getting there? As such, Sartre's work is a brand of 
humanism. Traditional Christian humanism, which regards man
as provided by God. with certain, graces., talents and gifts.
which must be used to obtain eternal happiness, for Sartre, 
is an arbitrary determinism and therefore nonsense. Nor does 
Sartre completely agree with an atheistic humanism which re­
gards man as being subjectively responsible for developing 
individual “grace" and talent for the purpose of creating a 
certain personal happiness as well as uplifting mankind while 
reaching for immortality. As Sartre says; "This . . .  the­
ory takes man as an end and as a higher value. . . that 
I, as man, shall personally consider myself responsible for, 
and honored by, acts of a few particular men. This kind of
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Humanism we can do without.'* The meaning of humanism, for
Sartre, is this:
Man is constantly outside of himself; in projecting 
himself, in losing himself outside of himself, he 
makes for man‘s existing; and on the other hand, it 
is by pursuing transcendent goals that, he is able 
to exist; man being this state of passing beyond, 
is at the heart, at the center of this passing be­
yond, There is no universe other than a human 
universe, the universe of human subjectivity. This 
connection between transcendency, as a constitutent 
element of man - not in the sense that God is trans­
cendent, but in the sense of passing beyond - and 
subjectivity, in the sense that man is not closed in 
on himself but is always present in a human universe, 
is what we call.humanism.
Humanism, because we remind man that there is 
no law-maker other than himself, and that in his for­
lornness he will decide by himself; because we point 
out that man will fulfil himself as man not in turn­
ing towards himself but in seeking outside of himself 
a goal which is just this liberation, just this part­
icular fulfilments (Exist*. p.60).
Given his principles, then, Sartre has constructed a system 
which illuminates choice and probability, which stresses the 
essential freedom of man and a certain function of the other 
in conditioning choice and freedom. He has developed a the­
ory which centers upon and makes possible the existence of 
man, given the situation of man and man's condition as Sartre 
understands them. Thus the work is not without value. On 
the contrary the very impetus for this existentialism seems 
to be founded upon the essentially religious experience of a 
man having come from nothing and going towards nothing —  and 
as such it has humanistic implications.
But what of the inconsistencies, the apparent “bad 
faith?" Well, if man comes from nothing and for no reason, 
then he has an irrational beginning. ' He lives a life about
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which he has only an historical knowledge and moves towards 
his own total annihilation* The only salvation for Sartre, 
then, is the rational recognition of irrationalism. As Nor­
man Greene puts it, this is ”. . .  a sort of reverse stoicism, 
the living by man of the life determined for him by his pro­
ject.”41
In other words, man lives in a condition of indefinite 
compounding. The important thing is not to lose, yet one 
never wins. The essence of liberty lies in the uncertainty 
and risk involved in the necessity of action. This new stoic­
ism like the old commands man to look within, to recognize
the universal in himself,, but unlike the old stoicism it can-
42not believe that “no natural desire is in vain." This 
stoicism of Sartre's is designed not only to confront exter­
nal desolation but also the powerful contradictory impulses 
from within as well. In anguish man will see himself, his 
contradictory condition, and his freedom to act “as i f  he 
were God.
Thus Sartre!s doctrine may properly be called an atheistic 
theology for, though it is diametrically opposed to a God- 
centered world, nevertheless, it rests its case upon God or
at least upon the “non-existence" of God. The very impetus 
and drive for all of men's actions, according to Sartre, is
41 Norman Greene, Existential Ethics.! (Ann Arbor: I960},
P. 206. / ' ‘ ‘ ‘ ..
42 Simone de Beauvoir, Pyrrhus and Cyneas, Trans. Catherin 
Freemantie, Partisan Review, Summer, 1946.
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found in the longing to be and the attempt to become God* In 
facts Sartre implies that the philosophy of existence is im­
possible without first annihilating God® He says that:
Atheistic existentialism., which I represent, is more 
coherent. It states that if God does not exist, 
there is at least one being in whom existence pre­
cedes essence, a being who exists before he can be 
defined by any concept, and that this being is man, 
or, as Heidegger says, human reality® What is 
meant here by saying that existence precedes essence?.
It means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, 
appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines 
himself. If man, as the existentialist conceives 
him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is 
nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and 
he will have made what he will be. Thus, there is 
no human nature, since there is no God to conceive 
it. Not only Is man what he conceives himself to 
be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be 
after this thrust toward existence, (Exist., p.18).
As was shown previously, Descartes, in his search for 
“clear and distinct*’ Ideas, ignored the immediate fact of ex­
istence. The dualism of res extensa and res coaitans is 
founded essentially on a separation of man's essence from his 
existence, and Descartes never succeeded in synthesizing or 
welding them together again. The reaction of the existential­
ists was to expose man as a feeling creature, a finite crea­
ture caught In the paradox of his search for the Infinite.
A creature that must believe his heart because his reason Is 
inadequate.
Since the vex*y basis of our action is founded upon an 
assumed impossibility, i.e. the existence of God and the tend­
ing of man toward God, Sartre's chief effort is to get man to 
face squarely the implications for personal action in a uni­
verse without purpose. Starting with an assumed first
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principle, that of the non-existence of God, and denying the
existence of a fixed human nature, man is allowed no exter­
nal support and is therefore fully responsible for his own 
character, judgments and choices®
Kierkegaard, for example, ’understood man as a creature 
who cannot prove the existence of God but who leaps to Him in 
an act of ultimate faith® Sartre, however, leaps away from 
God® The fact of God for Sartre is an illusion caused by cer­
tain basic aspects of the total human condition® In fact, 
belief in God, for Sartre, is detrimental to human welfare 
and is caused by a form of ’’bad faith" or refusal to face the 
fact of human freedom. » • the first act of bad faith is' 
to flee what It cannot flee, to flee what it is,81 (Exist., 
p015). Bad faith is a response to a situation in which man 
faces the difficulty of conquering himself as a self in a 
world created by others, but which he, by virtue of the ne­
cessity of his dependence accepts as his own® He must assert 
the world as it appears to him. The recognition of freedom is 
inseparable from anguish and the recognition of solitude is 
accompanied by nausea® Desire breeds frustration and satis­
faction is impossible® It is the "human condition" with its 
inner conflict and struggle which leads to "bad faith”, (B.K.
P © id 3 a
Sartre admits that in claiming to be an atheist he is 
going beyond the certainty of experience to the realm of the 
hypothetical and probable. The existence or non-existence 
of God is a metaphysical question for him, and he regards
DXNERSfTY OF WHDSOR LIBRARY
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metaphysics as an imaginative enterprise incapable of yield­
ing certainty® Sartre's ontology differs from a metaphysics 
in that it is a description of facts, and thus, he believes, 
it is subject to the criteria of truth or falsity* He seems 
to have a basic reluctance to assume more than is justified 
by the "clear" testimony of experience*
Sartre is preoccupied essentially,, with men-in-situa- 
tionsa with man and the human condition of man, but he seems 
to be looking at man from the point of view of a psychologist 
or sociologist, even though his work is couched in quasi- 
philosophic language® First, let it be kept in mind that 
one studying Sartre is dealing with a phenomenology and as 
such the work is limited to subjective description® For this 
reason it cannot be a philosophy either of being or of nothing­
ness, for the intuition of either of these notions must nec­
essarily be outside of any particular phenomenon® By the 
same token it cannot be a humanism in the traditional sense, 
because traditional humanism draws upon principles, norms and 
criteria obtaining in a penetrating analysis of the human per-_ 
son* In spite of the fact that Sartre makes the "human condi­
tion5" the central theme of his '"description", this could never 
take the place of a philosophical analysis any more than the 
confessional could take the place of psycho-analysis or soci­
ology could take the place of moral theology®
The final metaphysical breakdown is forced upon Sartre by 
his own phenomenological criteria when he attempts to discuss 
existence prescinded from essence® This destroys’ the very
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existences, the starting point of Sartre's system because of 
an all exclusive concentration upon existences One is speak­
ing of nothing If he attempts to speak of an essence which 
does not exist in some way, and so9 also, Sartre is speaking 
of nothing when he attempts to talk about individual exist­
ent s which are not some-tilings, which have no form or nature; 
which, in other words, are unspeakable* By throwing out 
natures, Sartre -also destroys existence and from then on his 
existents have, strangely3 many essential characteristics. 
(For example, existence is essentially free.)
Rather than a metaphysic or even a philosophy of nature, 
what Sartre has here is a description of the interplay of en­
vironmental factors conditioning the man (psychology) or his 
collectivity (sociology), which description is itself invol­
ved In this "human condition"®
Farther, Sartre not only destroys existence but he also 
destroys discourse. Plato saw the need of constructing some­
thing other than being (non-being), in order to talk about 
being. The attempt of Sartre to create a rational system of 
description of totally Involved personal irrationalism, us­
ing terms which Invalidate themselves, communicating the in­
communicable and speaking about an unspeakable subject Is 
ambiguous.
The obvious moral breakdown of Sartre's existential hu­
manism is a result of the ambiguity of measuring without a 
measure8 The culmination of a vain and pretentious humanism 
which attempts to seal man off from God and make the creature
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instead of the creator the measure of all things, is precisely
this kind of ultra-personal individualism*
There can be little doubt that much of the success of 
Sartre and his philosophic and theological offspring is due 
to the new way of propagating ideas through literature es­
pecially the novel and the drama* The exponents of existen­
tialism, particularly in France* immediately saw the advant­
ages of literature over any formal scientific exposition for 
presenting the individual in his concrete existence,, Sartre's 
drama, Les Diablo s. et Le Pan Plan.* for example, has had far . 
greater influence than his treatise Being and Nothingness* 
Sartre passes from philosophy to the novel* to tragedy and to 
comedy without shifting his grounds because for him the the­
atre is nothing more than phenomenology played out on a stage.
In his dramas Sartre portrays the infietermination of 
human freedom, the contingency and absurdity of an existence 
in which human acts are disconnected, of no logical or moral 
significance, or in Sartrian terminology, wholly gratuitous.
It is evident that psychoanalysis, both as a method of 
psycho-therapy and as a branch of empirical psychology, has 
had tremendous influence everywhere and holds the interest of 
countless individuals. One consequence of this new science 
of man has been the desire to institute new norms which are 
independent of natural and Christian morality. Unconscious 
dynamisms and determinations lie beneath the apparent calm of 
consciousness and are guided by their own laws according to 
psychology. These laws and their dynamisms are- imperious in
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their demands upon man !s conscious behaviour* Conscience is 
not, as it may appear, a clear and placid realm where Judg­
ments of moral value regarding individual acts are reached.
It is rather a bundle of psychic energy rooted in instinctive 
and unconscious soil.
It is further affirmed that the evolution of conscience 
in its intellectual and affective formation is an extremely 
complicated phenomenon whose harmonious development and per­
fect maturation is found only in rare instances. In its ef­
forts to adapt itself to the real, the ego is barraged and 
battered by unbridled impulses of pleasure on one hand and 
by the inhibitions of external morality ox the other. If 
this conflict of the ago with the Id and superego is not hap­
pily resolved* we then have one or the other complex or ar- 
restation of the psychic dynamism. This degenerates progres­
sively Into nervous disorders* into intellectuals affective, 
and sensual regressions which fetter for one's entire life 
the jp ection and freedom of moral acts.
Nearly all persons, according to the psychoanalysts are 
afflicted with some such psychological devolution* If the 
psychic equilibrium is not evident,, it Is because the defects 
have been compensated by other capacities and resources of 
the individual. Hence some inclinations, even though the 
most noble and moral, can be found to be related to distur­
bances and regressions in the depth of the psyche. The parti­
cular tone of one's affections, of one's manner of seeing and 
Judging, is always linked to this mysterious part' of oneself.
*  ■
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One must be careful not to confuse virtue with what might be 
merely a defective development In a part of the personality.
If this is. carried to its logical limit* the unconscious 
dynamisms could, not only inhibit the free exercise- of the will* 
they could actually exclude, it altogether.. These forces bring 
such extrinsic pressure to bear on the subject* that although 
the will remains free to offer its theoretical consent to the 
moral judgment of conscience* it is nevertheless physically 
impossible to actualize that judgment*
Man'to-day has a horror of the fixed* the determinate, , 
the eternal. Three persons seated upon divans in a parlour 
look out of painted windows with no other amusement than 
their mutual self-torture carried on in a delirium which al­
ways returns to where it began® This* according to Sartre,
Is man's hell, and it Is shared by all those who cannot dis­
cover the true sense, at once human and divine, of man's 
fleeting and painful existence on earth*
Criticism, of 3ar.tr q
But even as a psychology, Sartre's existentialism disin­
tegrates thought more than promoting or enriching it, and 
those who have written defensive critiques of Sartre's work, 
such as Maurice Nathanson, have been very subtle in negating 
the most positive assertions of Sartre whose logic ends up by 
destroying itself*
A philosopher who considers rationality the supreme Il­
lusion of human consciousness is a priori not even worthy of
>  ■
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
criticism* Therefore it is a moot question whether Sartre is 
right or wrong, whether he is a charlatan of genius or a poor 
fellow caught in the trap of his own dialectics.
The fact that Sartrean existentialism expresses itself 
in a whole series of morbid literary works seems to corrobo- ’
AS
rate the opinions of critics such as Roger Troisfontaines, 
that this is not simply a reaction against the rationalistic 
and idealistic trends which too long dominated philosophical 
thought in the nineteenth,, and at the beginning of the twen­
tieth century, cutting that thought off and making it ster- , 
ile. Rather, they recognise that this noisy explosion of ex­
istentialism had emotional roots and arose out of the fright­
ful cataclysm of war*
It Is well that Sartre has raised the question of the 
meaning of human existence for all reflection should take In­
to account the destiny of man himself® Philosophy is not 
only a scheme of ideas; it is the establishment of a position 
with regard to the absolute and each one of us, at every mo­
ment, irrevocably stakes Infinite values® But one should not 
allow the abuse of deadening abstractions to throw one into 
the sticky subjectivity of the hard existent, as the exagger­
ated systematization of Hegel drove Kierkegaard to clench his 
fists in a fit of fideistic despair® Philosophy, which Is an 
understanding of reality, Is not based upon the' particular, 
sunk into itself, nor upon bloodless generalities.
43 Roger Troisfontaines “Existentialism and Christianity1’, 
Trans® M„ J®, Kerr (London: Adam & CharlesBlack Co®, 1949).
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When, with regard to action9s internal springs, one tries 
to describe the interlocking links of action, one should 
never do it as if analysis were sufficient of itself, or as 
if description could be gratuitous• There are over-all struc­
tures, supra-individual standards, organic wholes, and intel­
ligible syntheses® In short, there are regulative and judi­
cative truths without which Sartre could not realize that 
physical being constantly becomes stickier, like a homogene­
ous mass, nor that consciousness expands like a fullness 
overflowing, nor, above all, that the two oppose each other,- 
either painfully to prolong their separation, or to project 
themselves, discovering In the unexpectedness of this leap 
forward the very essence of freedom from any value* If Sar­
tre's phenomenology has continued to develop contradictory 
dialectics, it Is because he has revived the divorce between 
the Individual and the universal® He starts by making the 
individual sacrosanct and to this one point, chosen arbitrar­
ily, Is then tries to bring all the facets and values of ex­
istence into this perspective, cost what it may* This is the . 
worst of all abstractions: to seek to reduce to an Identical
norm— ■ arbitrarily conceived —  the diverse reactions and 
needs of human beings which can be Integrated only in a hier­
archy of principles and values» If Sartrian humanism is only 
true for Sartre, then it may be said that it Is no longer 
true, even for himj truth and universality are one®
Once the initial perspective of humanism is distorted, 
the vision of the whole remains disturbed* What are these
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notions of '•factitiousness'1, “utility11, “existential choice*', 
and even, of equivocal "transcendence"? The simple state­
ment of a "pure" fact is unintelligible; the most elementary 
fact is always in some degree elaborated so that the penetra­
tion of the object by the subject began long before Sartre 
declared that it was impossible* Similarly, what clear-cut 
idea is one to understand when Sartre, in the mode of pragma­
tism, speaks of the artificiality of the world? This notion 
turns back upon its creator to prove to him that, if the 
world is relative to his ability to construct it, far from 
being enslaved by "mundaneness", he can dominate "mundaneness" 
by the absoluteness of the spirit* As for the idea of "pure 
choice", identified with the blind existential urge, it means 
only an obscure tendency, radically biological, with utilitar­
ian or hedonistic fruits, If no coherent science can be 
worked out concerning existence, and freedom is conceived 
without an inwardness that is both demanding and sanctioning, 
not only does all metaphysics or morality become impossible, 
but all reason becomes impossible too. Finally, what can be 
said o„ the caricature of transcendence that is offered by 
Sartre to designate in turn the exterior position of the ex­
istent "with regard to himself, his privacy over nothingness, 
his very precarious.control of the world and his "project" 
within an illusory freedom. Nowhere Is the authentic trans­
cendence of the immanent and demanding Absolute discussed, 
and, fundamentally, it is logical that this system which has 
brought the mind down to the level of the irrational should
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bring transcendence down to the level of the unreal.
From Sartre's existential humanism the idea to be retain­
ed is that a practical and militant philosophy is necessary, 
since in the question, "What is man?", Sartre is Included and 
compromised to the point where he can no longer answer ob­
jectively without taking a stand for or against his own exis­
tence, It has been the goal of philosophical effort to show 
that the idea of an act and the act itself are not the same 
thing and that a proper place in philosophy must be given to 
that which until now seemed impossible to identify in the ex­
treme diversity of the elusive contingency which attends con­
crete existences. But what can be retained of the negative 
Sartrean humanism? Its psychoanalytical explorations have 
revealed as yet unplumbed depths of egoism and perversity in 
man, rather than treasures of generosity. Can Sartre be said 
to have enriched one's knowledge of humanity by his contri­
bution of cynical "totalism"? Definitely not, for the truth 
is always of the spirit. It disintegrates in descriptive 
complacency and the workings of an unhealthy imagination dis­
turbed by animal cravings. It seems that Sartre does not 
really wish to solve the problems of existence but rather to 
curb one's right to raise the real problems. This may be 
why he destroys, a priori, any relationship between the sub­
ject and the object, between the subject and himself, between 
the subject and other subject® But then, whom will he con­
vince that man lives only for this disgusting "mess" and.that 
he dies merely to prove the absurdity of life? . Ihy must the
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irrational be the favourite food of man's reason, rather than 
that which transcends it and fulfils it? Could it be because 
reason can juggle with the unreasonable, while it must show 
itself humble before standards that go beyond it? It is time 
now for the mind, after this sortie into the Darkness, to re­
affirm its rights to universality and inwardness, instead of 
allowing itself to be deceived by an overly visceral imagin­
ation e
Sartre has- tried to construct a radical philosophy of 
freedom© Yet by it one is not led down the road to the deif­
ication of man® On the contrary, the freedom of which Sartre 
speaks is not a positive and creative freedom® It is a de­
structive, annihilative. freedom. Sartre looks upon man as the 
being that is the source of nothingness. Had not human real­
ity sprung up, like an erosive canker, in the very heart of 
being, being would always be unchanged; nothingness would not 
exist® If nothingness has come to exist it is due to this 
most singular act, human reality, which is consequently the 
sole basis of nothingness in the heart of being. And why is 
man the source of nothingness? Because he is free, unique 
among all beings in the world. T’reedom is the condition of 
the work of annihilation carried out by man in the heart of 
being® Thus freedom is not merely a sentence passed on man, 
in the sense that he himself has not chosen it; it is also 
the fundamental condition of the nothingness which is man 
and which he has carved out of being, like a hole that may 
never be filled in® Sartre's man is the sheer antithesis of
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God, who creates the world out of nothingness; he creates 
nothingness out of the world.
No more radical and paradoxical inversion of humanism 
could be imagined. In traditional humanism man builds and 
enriches the world through his works. In Sartre's conception, 
man delves within the world like a worm, grinding it into 
fragments, corroding it and impoverishing it. Man is a use­
less passion, (B.N., p.615).
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